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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jeffrey Thies was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine, two counts of 
felony injury to a child, misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, 
misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and misdemeanor concealment of 
evidence. Mr. Thies filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. The district court denied Mr. Thies' suppression motion, finding that the 
officers did not unreasonably extend the length of the investigatory detention to 
investigate alleged criminal activity. Mr. Ties proceeded to trial and was convicted of 
trafficking in methamphetamine, two counts of misdemeanor injury to a child, 
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, possession of paraphernalia, and 
concealment of evidence. On appeal, Mr. Thies contends that Officer Vogt 
unconstitutionally extended the investigatory detention, took longer than necessary to 
effectuate the seizure, and did so without his consent, in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On August 11, 2010, at approximately 5:44 p.m., Officer Daniel Vogt responded 
to a 911 report from dispatch of a "mobile domestic violence situation." (3/9/11 
Tr., p.78, Ls.1-14.) Prior to the 911 call, Mr. Thies and Patricia Price were driving 
toward Mountain View High School to take Ms. Price's two sons to driver's education 
training. (3/9/11 Tr., p.7, Ls.4-20, p.38, Ls.6-16.) While at the intersection of Overland 
1 
and Meridian, Mr. Thies and Ms. Price got into a verbal disagreement and Ms. Price 
threw "'some items at Jeff and a couple of them went out the window and struck" David 
Biehl's vehicle. (3/9/11 Tr., p.7, L.21 - p.8, L.2.) One of Ms. Price's sons got out of the 
vehicle in an attempt to pick up a lighter, one of the items thrown out the window. 
(3/9/11 Tr., p.29, Ls.11-22.) Mr. Biehl called 911 and followed Mr. Thies' vehicle to 
Mountain View High School. (3/9/11 Tr., p.8, Ls.2-3.) Upon arrival, Mr. Thies dropped 
Mr. Price's sons at the curb, parked, and exited the vehicle. (3/9/11 Tr., p.38, L.17 -
p.40, L.6.) 
Shortly thereafter, Officer Vogt arrived and immediately placed Mr. Thies in 
handcuffs. (3/9/11 Tr., p.81, Ls.8-23.) While Officer Vogt was in the process of 
handcuffing Mr. Thies, at least three other officers arrived on the scene. (3/9/11 
Tr., p.81, Ls.19-23, p.82, L.9 - p.84, L.15.) Officer Vogt read Mr. Thies his Miranda1 
rights and began asking him about the situation in the vehicle while Officer Monte Price 
questioned Ms. Price. (3/9/11 Tr., p.85, Ls.18-25; Exhibit 3.) Mr. Thies informed Officer 
Vogt that he and Ms. Price, his common law wife, had a verbal disagreement, but there 
was no physical violence. (3/9/11 Tr., p.86, Ls.1-3.) At about 5:45 of Officer Price's 
audio, Ms. Price informed him that she had a verbal disagreement with Mr. Thies, but 
that it had not been physical. 2 (Exhibit 3, Officer Price Audio at 5:45.)3 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2 Officer Price's audio recording seemingly starts soon after the dispatch call and 
continues recording throughout the incident. At approximately 4 minutes into the audio, 
Officer Price arrives on the scene, which is, according to the dispatch, about 2 minutes 
after Officer Vogt arrives on the scene. (Exhibit 3.) 
3 There are three separate audio recordings on Exhibit 3. Two of the three are from 
Officer Vogt's recorder, the final, complete recording was from Officer Price's recorder. 
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At approximately 5:52 p.m., Officer Vogt ran a "records check" and learned that 
Mr. Thies had a suspended driver's license. (3/9/11 Tr., p.89, Ls.17-23.) Mr. Thies 
admitted to being the driver of the vehicle. (3/9/11 Tr., p.89, L.24 - p.90, L.4.) 
According to Officer Vogt, Mr. Thies was sweating profusely and seemed concerned 
with Sergeant Taylor looking into the windows of his vehicle. (3/9/11 Tr., p.91, Ls.3-23.) 
Officer Vogt then repeatedly requested permission to search the vehicle and Mr. Thies 
repeatedly refused to consent to a search. (3/9/11 Tr., p.93, Ls.14-18; Exhibit 3, Officer 
Vogt Audio 2.) After Mr. Thies refused to allow officers to search his vehicle, Officer 
Vogt contacted Officer Lindley for use of his narcotic detection canine and began 
working on the citation for driving without privileges. (3/9/11 Tr., p.93, L.19 - p.94, L.5.) 
At approximately 14 minutes into Officer Price's audio the narcotics canine is requested. 
(Exhibit 3, Officer Price Audio at 14:00.) At the time of the request, Officer Lindley was 
involved in another traffic stop and was not immediately available. (3/9/11 Tr., p.125, 
Ls.1-9.) At approximately 30:30 of Officer Price's audio, it is apparent the canine is on 
the scene as Ms. Price as asked to step back because the canine gets nervous. 
(Exhibit 3, Officer Price Audio at 30:30.) About 45 second later, the canine hits on 
Ms. Price's purse. (Exhibit 3, Officer Price Audio at 31:15.) 
Based upon the canine's initial hit on the outside of the vehicle and subsequent 
alert on Ms. Price's purse, officers searched the vehicle, uncovering methamphetamine 
in a Crown Royal bag under the driver's seat, marijuana in a purse in the front 
passenger seat, a partially smoked marijuana joint in the ash tray, and various alleged 
paraphernalia. (3/9/11 Tr., p.96, Ls.9-20, p.107, L.7 - p.108, L.21.) Mr. Thies and 
Ms. Price were placed under arrest. 
3 
In November of 2010, Mr. Thies was charged by Amended Information with 
trafficking in methamphetamine, two counts felony injury to a child, misdemeanor 
possession of a controlled substance, misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and 
misdemeanor concealment of evidence. (R., pp.36-38.) Mr. Thies filed a Motion to 
Suppress and Amended Motion to Suppress arguing that he was unreasonably 
detained during an unconstitutional expansion of an investigatory seizure. (R., pp.42-
43, 71-82.) Following a hearing on the motions, the district court denied Mr. Thies' 
suppression motions. (R., pp.125-126.) The district court concluded that the lengthy 
detention was not unreasonable because officers were still investigating the alleged 
domestic violence incident and the potential malicious injury to property allegation for 
the objects that struck Mr. Biehl's vehicle during the mobile dispute. (3/9/11 Tr., p.158, 
L.12 - p.162, L.24.) Additionally, the district court concluded that Officer Vogt had not 
finished writing the ticket for driving without privileges. (3/9/11 Tr., p.162, L.25 - p.164, 
L.16.) 
Mr. Thies proceeded to trial and was convicted of trafficking in 
methamphetamine, two counts of misdemeanor injury to child, misdemeanor 
possession of a controlled substance, possession of paraphernalia, and concealment of 
evidence. (R., pp.173-178.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen 
years, with three years fixed for the trafficking in methamphetamine conviction. 
(R., pp.218-220.) The district court also imposed 90 days for each of the 
misdemeanors, to be served concurrently. (R., pp.218-220.) Mr. Thies filed a Notice of 
Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment of Conviction and Commitment. 
(R., pp.228-230.) l\/lr. Thies then filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, which was 
denied by the district court. (R., pp.233-239.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Thies' Motion to Suppress because Officer Vogt 
unconstitutionally extended the investigatory detention longer than necessary to 
effectuate the seizure, without his consent, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Thies' Motion To Suppress Because Officer 
Vogt Unconstitutionally Extended The Investigatory Detention Longer Than Necessary 
To Effectuate The Stop, Without His Consent, In Violation Of The Fourth Amendment Of 
The United States Constitution And Article I. § 17 Of The Idaho Constitution 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Thies contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
because Officer Vogt impermissibly extended the investigatory detention of Mr. Thies 
longer than necessary to effectuate the stop. 
B. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Thies' Motion To Suppress Because 
Officer Vogt Unconstitutionally Extended The Investigatory Detention Longer 
Than Necessary To Effectuate The Stop, Without His Consent, In Violation Of 
The Fourth Amendment Of The United States Constitution And Article I, § 17 Of 
The Idaho Constitution 
Mr. Thies contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
because Officer Vogt improperly extended the investigatory detention by waiting for the 
drug detection canine to arrive on the scene, thereby violating his rights under Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable and thus, violations of the 
Fourth Amendment. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288 (1995); State v. Mcintee, 124 
Idaho 803 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Wight, 117 Idaho 604 (Ct. App. 1990). However, 
the State may rebut this presumption by establishing that a warrantless search either 
fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement, or was otherwise 
reasonable under the circumstances. Weaver, 127 Idaho at 290; Mcintee, 124 Idaho at 
804. If evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant 
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requirement, the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded 
as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
When reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, 
Idaho appellate courts defer to the trial court's factual findings which are not clearly 
erroneous; factual findings supported by substantial competent evidence are not clearly 
erroneous. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485 (2007) (citing State v. Klingler, 143 
Idaho 494, 495-96 (2006)); State v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 374 (Ct. App. 2009). 
However, a trial court's legal conclusions and whether constitutional requirements have 
been satisfied based on the facts found are freely reviewed. Id. 
Here, Mr. Thies filed a motion to suppress, asserting that the investigatory 
detention was unreasonably extended while Officer Vogt waited for a drug detention 
canine. (R., pp.71-82.) The district court denied his suppression motion, concluding 
that Mr. Thies was not unreasonably detained for an extended period of time in light of 
the officers' investigation and that Officer Vogt had not completed Mr. Thies' citation for 
driving without privileges. (3/9/11 Tr., p.158, L.12 - p.164, L.16.) 
Mr. Thies asserts that Officer Vogt improperly extended the permissible length of 
his investigatory detention of Mr. Thies by taking 25 minutes to investigate the alleged 
criminal offenses by Mr. Thies and Ms. Price and taking approximately 13 minutes to fill 
out a simple citation in anticipation of a requested canine unit, as a result the district 
court erred in denying his suppression motion. When the purpose of the detention is to 
investigate a traffic offense or other crime, the Fourth Amendment will not be offended, 
if the action is based upon a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the vehicle or 
occupant has been, or is about to be, involved in criminal activity. State v. Gutierrez, 
137 Idaho 647, 650 (Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted); State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 
7 
119, 124 (Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted). However, the investigative stop must be 
temporary, and inquiries made by the officer must be '"reasonably related in scope to 
the justification for their initiation."' State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 853 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(citations omitted). Such an investigative stop "must be justified by a reasonable 
suspicion on the part of the police, based upon specific articulable facts, that the person 
to be seized has committed or is about to commit a crime." State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 
613, 615 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); State v. 
Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 302 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103 
(Ct. App. 1992)). 
It is the State's burden to demonstrate that the vehicle stop or seizure it seeks to 
justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and 
duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure. State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 
99, 101 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361-62 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(citations omitted). Under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, evidence that is not 
seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, and thus 
discovered as a result of an illegal search, cannot be used as proof against the victim of 
the search. Such exclusionary prohibition extends to the indirect products of the initial 
unlawful police conduct State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235, 239 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963)). 
In Parkinson, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that determining whether 
an investigative detention is reasonable requires an inquiry as to whether the officer's 
action was justified at its inception and "whether it was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Parkinson, 135 
Idaho at 361 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968)). The prohibition against 
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unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent a search that is "not limited to the 
particularly described 'place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized[.]"' 
Id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 499-500). The United States Supreme Court 
unequivocally has asserted that, "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity warrants a 
temporary seizure for the purpose of questioning limited to the purpose of the stop." 
Royer, 460 U.S. at 498 (emphasis added). It is well established that an investigative 
detention "must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop," and a citizen "may not be detained even momentarily without 
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so." State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651-52 
(Ct. App. 2002) (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 498, 500). Furthermore, although the stop of 
the vehicle may be of short duration, if the continued detention of the driver 
unreasonably extends beyond the length necessary for the purpose of the stop, the 
continued detention of the driver without any reasonable suspicion to support such 
inquiry is violative of the Fourth Amendment. Gutierrez, at 652 (citing United States v. 
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519-20 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by 
United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Valdez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2001 )). 
However, it is recognized that the purpose of the stop is not always "fixed" at 
the time the stop is first initiated, as a routine traffic stop could turn up suspicious 
conditions that "could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the stop. The 
officer's observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop may -- and 
often do -- give rise to legitimate reasons for particular lines of inquiry and further 
investigation by an officer." Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362 (citing State v. Myers, 118 
Idaho 608, 613 (Ct. App. 1990)). 
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Here, Mr. Thies does not contend that Officer Vogt did not have reasonable 
suspicion to temporarily detain him to investigate the alleged domestic violence situation 
and the malicious injury to property allegation, but that Officer Vogt improperly extended 
the detention after investigation of the alleged criminal activities should have been 
completed and by taking approximately 15 minutes to fill out a simple driving without 
privileges citation. According to the Officer Price's audio recording, Officer Vogt 
apparently located Mr. Thies and his vehicle about 2 minutes into the recording. 
(Exhibit 3, Officer Price Audio at 1 :56.) Officer Lindley did not arrive with the drug 
canine until about 25 minutes after Officer Vogt's initial contact with Mr. Thies. (Prelim., 
p.24, Ls.9-20.) Officer Vogt testified that he requested the canine unit after learning that 
Mr. Thies' license was suspended and after Mr. Thies refused to allow Officer Vogt to 
search his vehicle. (3/9/11 Tr., p.87, L.17 - p.89, L.23, p.93, Ls.6-22.) According to 
Officer Price's audio recording, Officer Vogt requested the canine approximately 12 
minutes after his initial contact with Mr. Thies, then immediately began working on the 
citation. (Exhibit 3, Officer Price Audio at 14:00; 3/9/11 Tr., p.93, L.23 - p.94, L.5.) 
Thus, it took Officer Vogt over 13 minutes to complete a simple driving without 
privileges citation that he admitted he could probably complete in four to five minutes. 
(3/9/11 Tr., p.128, Ls.4-8.) Moreover, Officer Vogt admitted that he knew he did not 
have probable cause to search the vehicle but "was interested to see what was inside of 
[the car]." (3/9/11 Tr., p.123, L.17 - p.124, L.B.) Thus, it is readily apparent that Officer 
Vogt, after Mr. Thies refused to consent to a search of his vehicle, was intent upon 
waiting for a canine unit based upon his hunch the vehicle contained contraband even 
though Officer Vogt admitted that he did not include in his report that Mr. Thies smelled 
of marijuana on his person or had a green tongue. (3/9/11 Tr., p.136, L.25 - p.137, 
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L.7.) Accordingly, Officer Vogt unreasonably delayed his detention of Mr. Thies by 
taking approximately 13 minutes to fill out a simple citation. 
Additionally, based upon the record before this Court, the district court's finding 
that the officers' investigation of Mr. Thies for domestic violence and Ms. Price for 
malicious injury to property was not yet completed by the time the canine alerted on the 
vehicle was clearly erroneous. See State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485 (2007); State v. 
Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 374 (Ct. App. 2009). Officer Vogt testified that very soon after 
arriving on the scene, he Mirandized Mr. Thies and learned from Mr. Thies that the 
disagreement with Ms. Price had only been verbal, not physical. (3/9/11 Tr., p.85, L.18 -
p.86, L.3; Exhibit 3 Officer Vogt Audio.) Officer Vogt also acknowledged that he did not 
observe any marks or physical injuries upon Ms. Price. (3/9/11 Tr., p.120, Ls.7-13.) 
Moreover, very soon after Officer Price's arrival on the scene he learned from Ms. Price 
that the argument between Mr. Thies and Ms. Price had not been physical. (Exhibit 3 
Officer Price Audio.) Finally, Officer Vogt testified that collectively, the officers had 
learned that there was no physical altercation in the vehicle. (3/9/11 Tr., p.119, Ls.13-
17.) Thus, early in the investigation, any concerns of a domestic violence incident 
having previously occurred had been dispelled. 
Furthermore, just as the officer's concerns regarding the domestic incident had 
been dispelled early on, the investigation of a potential malicious injury to property 
allegation was concluded at the time, or shortly after, Ms. Price told Officer Price that 
she did in fact throw items out the window of the vehicle, which struck Mr. Biehl's 
vehicle, causing minimal damage. (Exhibit 3, Officer Price Audio.) Accordingly, the 25 
minute detention of Mr. Thies was unreasonable and was clearly for the purpose of 
waiting for a drug dog to arrive on the scene to satisfy Officer Vogt's curiosity as he 
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"was interested to see what was inside of [the car]." (3/9/11 Tr., p.123, L.17 - p.124, 
L.8.) 
Accordingly, because Mr. Thies was detained "even momentarily" longer than 
necessary to effectuate the stop, his rights under the United States Constitution were 
violated. Mr. Thies asserts that the discovery of the evidence used against him was the 
product of his illegal detention and should have been suppressed as "fruit of the 
poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478-488 (1963). 
Therefore, Mr. Thies asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Thies respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his suppression motion and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 25th day of April, 2012. 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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